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COMMENTS
AN APPROPRIATE(D) PLACE IN TRANSFORMATIVE
VALUE: APPROPRIATION ART'S EXCLUSION FROM
CAMPBELL v. ACUFF-ROSE MUSIC, INC.
INTRODUCTION
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.' could very well go
down in jurisprudential history as the case that shepherded
copyright law's entry into the postmodern era. In holding that
a rap version of Roy Orbison's song "Oh, Pretty Woman" may
be a fair use of the copyrighted tune, the Court shifted its em-
phasis from the secondary work's commercial nature to its
"transformative value"-the parody's creation of "new insights
and understandings" of the original target.' In so doing, the
Supreme Court abandoned a rigid interpretation of fair use
and ensured that even "commercial" parodies may be immune
from copyright infringement.
The Supreme Court's salutary elimination of the commer-
cial presumption, however, is limited to works that convey a
parodic purpose. Consequently, while Acuff-Rose has rescued
one form of valuable artistic expression from an outmoded view
of creative value, it nonetheless implicitly excluded appropria-
tion art from fair use protection. By carving out a place for
commercial parodies, the decision essentially split the universe
of creative re-use into acceptable parodies and non-parodic
works, which are frowned upon as impermissible commercial
copying. Thus, the Court ignored the transformative value of a
creative work that criticizes without parodying its target and
1 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
2 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1111 (1990).
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allowed a presumption to remain against the work's commer-
cial character, thereby jeopardizing its immunity as fair use.
Since appropriationist works are not parodies and often entail
substantial replication of a copyrighted work's expression for
profit, they are likely to receive no protection under Acuff-Rose.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy's concurrence clearly states that a
secondary work made for profit, no matter how creative, is not
a fair use unless it evinces a parodic function.3 This supports
the Second Circuit's decision in Rogers v. Koons, which held
that Jeff Koons's appropriationist art work String of Puppies
infringed its target.4
The act of artistic appropriation is a progressive, pervasive
and effective mode of criticism and comment,5 and therefore
should be protected by copyright.6 A system by which to judge
an appropriationist work's use of copyrighted material is essen-
tial to preventing a chilling effect on this mode of discourse.!
' Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1180-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
4 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992); see also Acuff-
Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1180 (citing Koons).
' Appropriation deserves adequate protection primarily because it provides a
unique and valuable method for social criticism. See E. Kenly Ames, Beyond Rog-
ers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard For Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473,
1479 n.25 (1993). Considering copyright's goals of protecting new forms of expres-
sion and new creative developments, the appropriative act deserves fair use's cov-
erage not only for existing schools of postmodernism, but also as a creative dy-
namic used in future artistic movements. Id. Historically, imitation, and even
strict replication, has been practiced in one form or another by visual artists as
far back as the Impressionists and Cubists. For example, compare Claude Monet's
Bathing at la Grenouillre (1896) with Pierre Auguste Renoiys La Grenouillare
(1869), Monet's Sailboats at Argenteuil (1874) with Renoir's Sailboats at Argenteuil
(1874), Pablo Picasso's Accordionist (1911) with Georges Braque's Le Portugais (The
Emigrant) (1911-12), and Picasso's Ma Jolie (Woman with a Zitner or Guitar)
(1911-12) to Braque's Man with a Guitar (1911). In literature, Shakespeare's works
most often took from the plays and stories of other authors. For example, The
Merchant of Venice borrowed its basic story line, which includes an Italian gentle-
man who provides his adopted son with the necessary fimding from a Jewish
usurer to finance a trip to a maiden's distant island, from R/ Pecorone ("The
Dunce") by Ser Giovanni Fiorentino, as well as the persona of Shylock from Chris-
topher Marlowe's The Jew of Malta. THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 251 (G. Evans
ed., 1974). Compare also Shakespeare's Titus Andronicus (1593-94) with Ovid's
Metamorphoses (1567), and Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing (1598-99) to
Spenser's The Faerie Queene (1590).
6 Article I, section 8 states: "The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Two commentators have argued that because appropriationist art fimctions
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Absent such a framework, courts may conclude that non-
parodic appropriationist work lacks the transformative value
necessary to bring it within the fair use privilege. Given that
all contemporary art is essentially commercial, such a conclu-
sion could reduce all appropriationist replication to illicit copy-
ing.
Part I of this Comment discusses the theoretical frame-
work behind the act of appropriation primarily in the context
of contemporary art, and outlines the philosophical and practi-
cal differences between appropriation and parody. Part I also
emphasizes that the public value of appropriation lies in its
communicative function: the very act of appropriation operates
as language with which creators speak to and about their audi-
ences. Such communication takes on an interactive dimension
that has led, in many cases, to a more direct relationship be-
tween the creative arts and popular culture, inevitably increas-
ing the public's exposure to the arts.
Next, Part II analyzes how basic principles of copyright
law discourage appropriationist artists from working within
this creative genre. Part HI describes the statutory require-
ments of the fair use exception and how the defense, in princi-
ple, was created to nurture artistic movements like
appropriationism. Part III also reviews the state of fair use
and appropriation art before and after the Supreme Court's
decision in Acuff-Rose.
Part IV concludes with a discussion of how Acuff-Rose may
inhibit appropriationist art. By juxtaposing the fair use stan-
dard developed in Acuff-Rose to the facts in Rogers v. Koons,
this section shows how a transformative value test is suitable
for appropriationist art only when such works are acknowl-
edged as separate from parody. This Note suggests that recog-
nizing such a category facilitates an equitable balance between
the copyright holder and the contemporary artist's interests.
Indeed, debate over the most pragmatic mechanism by which
to monitor such uses has just begun.8 Yet, if the legal commu-
as semiotic discourse, the First Amendment should protect this mode of speech.
See Patricia A. Krieg, Note, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE
L.J. 1565 (1984); Martin H. Smith, Note, The Limits of Copyright: Property, Paro-
dy and the Public Domain, 42 DUKE L.J. 1233 (1993).
' See Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the Imminent Decline in
Authorial Control over Copyrighted Works, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY 93 (1994) (re-
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nity fails to acknowledge that appropriation benefits the public
by creating a closer relationship between art and society,
courts and legislators are not likely to devise a scheme to allow
appropriationists to work without fear of impending law suits.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decision, the critical
and social value of appropriationist uses remains unaddressed.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF APPROPRIATION
Prior to the Pop Artists, and particularly Andy Warhol, the
reigning attitude in the world of art was that of the Abstract Ex-
pressionists. Their idea was that America was a benighted, crassly
commercialized, rather horrible place, and that the artist could only
turn his back as best he could and avert his eyes from this side of
the modern world. Warhol came along as part of a slightly younger
generation, and his idea was, "Oh, it's so horrible, I love it.'
Appropriation is one of the most pervasive modes of con-
temporary artistic expression in large part because it is so
effective as a form of communication.' Appropriation acts as
a kind of enhanced language in which the artist makes the
audience aware of the significance of otherwise commonplace
and increasingly obscured objects. Everyday images such as
soup cans, flags, cigarette packages, money, movie stars, comic
strips and even shopping bags-the representations of which
ordinarily serve as cultural symbols-are transformed into a
language through which these artists communicate their mes-
sage. The modes of representation of these objects and the
level of their incorporation varies widely. Yet the creative sig-
nificance of all forms of appropriation-whether collage or
replication-derives from its ability to speak critically of the
society in which both the public and the artist live.
viewing three basic property theories by which to evaluate how best to accommo-
date appropriationist uses under copyright law); Robert A. French, Note, Rogers v.
Koons: Artistic Appropriation and the Fair Use Test, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 175 (1993)
(evaluating three model approaches to a fair use review of visual arts); Heather J.
Meeker, Note, The Ineluctable Modality of the Visible: Fair Use and Fine Arts in
the Post-Modern Era, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 195 (1993) (considering
the availability of alternative remedies to the fair use defense in the visual arts).
9 SUPERSTAR: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDY WARHOL (1990) (quoting Tom
Wolfe).
10 The term "appropriation" will be used in this Comment to mean unautho-
rized copying of all or most of a copyrighted image's expression by a contemporary
artist.
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In the visual arts-the medium on which this Note concen-
trates-such close ties with the everyday world were being de-
veloped as early as the Dadaist movement and Marcel
Duchamp's Ready-made."' Since 1914, the artistic currents of
Dada, Constructivism, the Bauhaus, and Pop art all led artists
to collect real-life objects and present these pieces not only as
the subjects of their art, but often as the art itself.2 Artists
such as Robert Rauschenberg, Richard Hamilton, Peter Blake,
Jasper Johns, Claes Oldenberg, James Rosenquist, Red
Grooms and Jim Dine widened creative access to the world
that surrounded them by working "in the gap between art and
life."13 Similarly, for postmodern artists, real-life objects signi-
fy both mass culture and serve as the pieces that comprise our
modern sense of reality. These objects, or signs, replace the
natural world mirrored in canvases and sculptures of the past,
so that "[t]he referent in postmodern art is no longer 'nature,'
n An example of a Ready-made sculpture is Duchamp's Fountain (1917), a
manufactured urinal that, once signed by the artist and proclaimed as his work,
was spontaneously transformed into art.
12 GINA PISCHEL, A WORLD HISTORY OF ART 658 (rev. ed. 1975) (describing
Duchamp's Ready-mades as "[tihe artists' reaction to the American myth of mecha-
nization as the solution to all problems"); cf Benjamin HD. Buchloh, Allegorical
Procedures: Appropriation and Montage in Contemporary Art, ARTFORUM, Sept.
1982, at 43; Hans Haacke, In the Vice, ART J., Fall 1991, at 49; Marcia E.
Vetrocq, Vexed in Venice, ART IN AMERICA, Oct. 1990, at 152. In 1955, Jasper
Johns' Flag was a major contribution in introducing the concept of appropriation
to American art. Pop artists like Robert Rauschenberg, Andy Warhol and Roy
Lichtenstein employed appropriation techniques by juxtaposing commodity images
with "mechanically produced high-cultural icons." Buchloh, supra, at 46. More
recently, Hans Haacke has directed his art at corporate targets like Mobil Oil
Company and Phillip-Morris Company to protest what he calls the "corporate take-
over of culture." Haacke, supra, at 51. Jac Leirner uses a patchwork of Bolla
wine, Marlboro, Kaufhof and Toys-R-Us logos sewn in a plastic quilt to highlight
the replacement of cultural value with market value, while Alain Clairet's bar
code paintings broach the issue of commercialization in the arts. Vetrocq, supra, at
159. For a critical discussion of how the artistic principle of reality is often used
to convey specific social and political messages in contemporary art, see Eric
Troncy, Being Positive Is the Secret of the 90s: A Comment on the Politically Cor-
rect Epidemic, FLASH ART, May/June 1992, at 96 (arguing that much of contempo-
rary art, in using real-world objects to critique real world problems, tends to con-
vey only those moral messages that are politically correct: 'The problem seems to
be that people want some art in reality and even a little reality in art, provid-
ing ... that it represents a bid to build a better world, about which everybody
has a different idea. The apparent obstinacy of a better world nowadays trans-
forms social protest into an artistic motor with discrimination, injustice, and segre-
gation fueling the production of art.").
13 DAVE MARSH, BEFORE I GLT OLD 168 (1983) (quoting Robert Rauschenberg).
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but the closed system of fabricated signs that make up our
environment."14
Such a rejection of the formalism of modern art and an
embracing of popular symbols is central to postmodern artists'
redefinition of artistic expression in contemporary society.
These artists condemn those traditional artistic principles that
insulate art from its social context. As a result, equipped with
the vocabulary of pop culture, contemporary art has achieved
its greatest popularity by shedding the common understanding
of "high art" as an elitist pursuit. In this way contemporary art
has used familiar images to become more accessible to the pub-
lic at large. 5 By increasing public access to artistic ideas and
subject matter, art reproductions have facilitated the spread of
appropriation art in the marketplace. Art as commodity is no
longer limited to the sale of the art piece itself, but has extend-
ed to the mass-marketing of the art work's image.
These commercial copies add yet another dimension of
replication to the appropriationist act of popular image repro-
duction by simultaneously returning the new altered image to
the lexicon of popular culture." By doing so, these copies also
'1 See John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual
Property Law, 13 COLUmi.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 111 (1989).
"s See Marcia Tucker, Foreword to ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING REPRE-
SENTATION, at vii (Brian Wallis ed., 1984); Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in ILLUMINATIONS (1969); Ames, supra note 5,
at 1480-81; Carlin, supra note 14, at 104. Benjamin Buchloh traces the historical
roots of this revolution of public perception of art when he comments on art histo-
rian Walter Benjamin's theory of montage:
The beginning of the Modernist avant-garde comes at the historical turn-
ing point where, under the impact of the rising participation of the mass-
es in collective production, the traditional models that had served in the
character formation of the bourgeois individual were rejected in favor of
models that acknowledged the social facts of a historical situation where
the sense of equality had increased to such a degree that equality was
gained even from the unique, by means of reproduction. This perceptual
change denied unique qualification and it dismantled by implication the
hierarchical ordering system of the bourgeois character structure. This
transformation of the individual psyche as well as that of larger social
structures was anticipated in new techniques and strategies of montage,
in which a new tactility established a new physiology of perception.
Buchloh, supra note 12, at 46. Carlin discusses Benjamin's view of how mass re-
production began to affect art by stating that "[t~he technology of mass media
changed the relationship of the masses to art in [Benjamin's] view, thus creating
new, democratic possibilities for cultural production." Carlin, supra note 14, at 104
n.4.
16 This dialectic of re-use, in which appropriationist pieces are, in turn, recy-
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increase the danger that the law will refuse to protect contem-
porary artistic expression by finding it to be no more than
plagiarism for profit. Ironically, when the danger that an
appropriationist will be enjoined from creating her works
heightens, appropriation's communicative power spreads as
such pieces are duplicated for public consumption or re-use by
other creatives. 7
cled as pop symbols and replicated on consumer products, has led artists like
Andy Warhol to abandon the role if appropriationist in favor of guarding his own
proprietary interests. See Hughes v. Design Look Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1500 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (holding that the defendant could not be enjoined from using Warhol works,
such as "Green Coca-Cola Bottles" (1965) and "Campbell's Soup" (1965), for which
it received permission from museum copyright holders, on its yearly calendar prod-
ucts, because an artist's right to control use of his or her work is relinquished
once the copyrights to those works are conveyed to another).
" Pop art has influenced the ways in which rock music and musicians have
marketed their work, themselves and their concert merchandise. See MARSH, supra
note 13, at 170; TONY STEWART, COOL CATS: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ROOK 'N'
ROLL STYLE 16, 42-45 (1982). Groups like The Who, The Jam, Blondie and Gener-
ation X have replicated Pop art tokens to image and icon on shirts worn on-stage
or in publicity shots and, in some instances, used these emblems as the back-
ground visual material of live performances. Pop art's effect on rock music perhaps
exemplifies the convergence of "high art" and pop culture. For Pop art not only in-
fluenced rock and roll as a commodity, but also at times supplied the thinking
behind what rock music could be capable of musically:
More than anything, pop art and the new rock music of the sixties
shared a creative, affirmative, imaginative response to the new technolo-
gy. How does the painter paint in a society where the dominant symbols
have been created and disseminated by advertising hucksters, often ex-
propriating recent avant-garde techniques? How does the musician com-
pose when what's being heard is not the instrument or the orchestra but
the noise that the instrument and/or orchestra makes, many times re-
moved, on a piece of black plastic with a context of its own? Just by
raising such questions, pop [art] gave itself more access to the society as a
whole than art had in many decades-and more leverage upon that soci-
ety. And in its performances-the 'happenings'-it brought high art closer
to show biz than anyone had dared in more than a century. This is what
John Russell refers to as the "element of exorcism" in pop, and it func-
tions as effectively in a Who 45 as in an Oldenberg sculpture, as provoc-
atively in a recording like Dylan's "I Want You" as in one of Roy
Lichtenstein's comic book paintings .... Thus were barriers-between
art objects and everyday stuff, between the theory of avant-garde viewers
and unaesthetic masses, between high culture and low, between respect-
ability and trash-not simply eradicated but demolished.
MlARSH, supra note 13, at 169 (emphasis added). Artist/author Dan Graham ob-
served that the punk movement's rejection of the sixties' cult of the pop music
"superstar" echoed Pop art's rejection of Abstract Expressionist notions of author-
ship and the "cult of the heroic." Dan Graham, The End of Liberalism, in Rock
My Religion 77 (Brian Wallis ed., 1993).
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Appropriation in contemporary art has been defined as an
allegorical process through which the artist uses symbols of
popular culture as parables of conspicuous consumption.18 The
pervasive and ubiquitous nature of mass-marketed items
transform these products into shared signifiers of reality. The
allegorical act entails extracting a signifier from everyday life,
and in turn reinjecting it without alteration into the context of
art, so that the work achieves the potency of the symbolic in a
minimalistic rhetoric of power. 9 By placing a universal object
such as Duchamp's Ready-made in the context of a gallery, the
artist simultaneously appropriates a sign's already laden popu-
lar significance and reinvests new meaning in the object as
testament to the vices or virtues of modern society." Shifting
the context of the image in this way transforms the meaning of
the original image by forcing the viewer to reevaluate his or
her former, most often unconscious, understanding of the im-
age.2
1
This process of transevaluation is what makes art valu-
able. Art is fundamental to society precisely because of its
ability to challenge old understandings, what Marcie Hamilton
has called a "reorientation experiment."' Thus, appropriation
should not be mistaken for plagiarism. By recontextualizing
the image, the artist has, in fact, transformed and altered it in
an attempt to force viewers to see the original work and its
significance differently. In turn, the audience is reoriented to
view not only the object, but to observe anew the positioning of
boundaries between the piece and the space that surrounds it;
between the art work and itself.2
" Buchloh, supra note 12, at 46. The term "allegorical" is used in this Com-
ment to refer to the appropriation process of borrowing everyday symbols without
altering them, and using the communicative power of these symbols to convey the
artist's own creative message. For discussions of Postmodern Art's use of allegory,
see Craig Owens, The Allegorical Impulse: Toward a Theory of Postmodernism, in
ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING REPRESENTATION 203 (Brian Wallis ed., 1984).
' See Anna C. Chave, Minimalism and the Rhetoric of Power, ARTS MAG., Jan.
1990, at 44-63. Art critic Benjamin Buchloh describes this postmodern use of alle-
gory as: "[t~he transformation of commodity to emblem . . . [which] came full circle
in the Ready-mades of Duchamp, where the willful declaration of the unaltered
object as meaningful and the act of appropriation allegorized creation by bracket-
ing it with the anonymous mass-produced object." Buchloh, supra note 12, at 46.
2o Ames, supra note 5, at 1481-82.
21 Ames, supra note 5, at 1481-82.
Hamilton, supra note 8, at 101.
See Rudolf Arnheim, Art Among the Objects, in TO THE RESCUE OF ART:
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The artist's critique of the symbolic object, however,
whether celebratory or condemning often does not speak to the
viewer by way of artistic authorship.24 In rejecting the mod-
ernist tradition of creative authorship as the sine qua non of
works of art, postmodern artists remove nearly all personal
identification from their pieces.' Instead, with little or no
alteration of the appropriated subject, intended messages are
conveyed through the language of the signifier in a merging of
mass culture and fine art." Postmodern artists deliberately
abstain from altering the appropriated symbol or adding stylis-
tic marks that would identify the artist's authorship in the
piece because, by principle, the symbol's own vocabulary is the
means by which the artist conveys the allegorical message.
TWENTY-SIX ESSAYS 7, 10 (1992). Arnheim focuses on the significance of context in
art:
What character traits enable objects to play their active part? Remember
that in the artistic practice of the last few centuries the objects populat-
ing paintings and sculpture and even architecture and the performing
arts have lost much of the broader environment with which they used to
interact. Within a single painting, to be sure, the figures of a dramatic
scene, the apples and bottles of a still life, or the shapes of an abstract
composition respond to one another, but the frame is the limit of this
small world. The work of art has become a mobile facility belonging no-
where and ready to be put anywhere. Its effect on its surroundings is
accidental, and the surroundings' influences on the work are unpredict-
able. Compare this vagrancy of paintings in our time with the estab-
lished place of the mosaics on the walls of a Byzantine church or the
stained glass windows of a Gothic cathedral, where the pictures were
indispensable components of their setting and received their meaning
from their setting. The same is true for sculpture, music, buildings, the-
ater, and dance. By now, the single art object, instead of being supported
in its particular function by its place and time, is expected to carry a
total and complete message against the opposition of an incongruous
neighborhood.
Id.
See Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and
Post-Modernism, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (1992).
Id. at 3-6 (explaining the importance of the artist's anonymity in appropria-
tion works). Greenberg states: "These artists ... strive to erase all authorship
from their work, replacing individual signature with trademarks of mass-produced
commodities. In so doing, they radically deny the notion of 'creative authorship' as
a principle and as a definitional codification for works of art."
2 Buchloh, supra note 12, at 47.
27 The works of artists Barbara Kruger and Sherry Levine best exemplify this
principle of appropriationist art. See JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE
IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW 236 (1991). Gaines discusses how Kruger and
Levine use problems of prohibited uses and the confines of possession and author-
ship as the objects of their art:
1995]
BROOKLYNLAWREVW
The principle behind such an intentional absence of au-
thorship is significant because artists risk copyright infringe-
ment when they subvert conventional notions of originality
through appropriation. An artist may hide from infringement
liability when exhibiting these works within the creative sanc-
tuary of a gallery or museum,' however, mass-marketing of
the allegorical pieces increases the likelihood of liability since
it puts intellectual property laws to "the stiffest test of 'free
commercial speech."'29 Before Acuff-Rose, this was so because,
most often, an automatic presumption of unfair use arose any
time a secondary work, which inhabited space in the market-
place, earned a commercial designation. Since the Supreme
Court's recent decision, artists still face this risk because the
transformative value test established in Acuff-Rose only con-
siders the quantitative or visible alterations to the image that
may be reasonably perceived."0 Absent additional stylistic
marks that would clearly comment on the original target, then,
when an appropriated work is placed on the market for profit,
its commercial nature is of renewed importance to courts once
the piece has seemingly failed to contribute to the original
Kruger's mock-up collages work by refusing the myth of artistic originali-
ty, by refusing to start from scratch, showing us instead that we must
use existing, available signs. As she pastes together advertising images
and "found" graphics, Kruger creates objects that are received as "art"
but that nevertheless gesture toward the impossibility of "creation."
Levine's work is also a testament to the inevitability of generic borrow-
ing, to the possibility of the total exhaustion of signs and the consequent
impossibility of producing anything entirely new. Part of the power of
Levine's work is in the way it works and keeps on working as conceptual
art. (One never has to see her masterpieces of photography refrained in
order to appreciate their concept).
Id. This need for total replication is comparable to, and yet forges beyond, textual
examples used by literary critics to convey a theory. Quoting text enables the
critic to illustrate theoretical observations with greater ease and accuracy and
often serves as an essential step in an explication of the text. For an
appropriationist, replicating copyrighted images shares in this process of explica-
tion, but also differs from practices of literary criticism because the former commu-
nicates critical messages exclusively by way of the appropriated piece whereas the
latter uses the borrowed text to buttress, elucidate or galvanize the secondary
author's exposition. To the appropriationist, the weight and significance of the
artistic message are most fully effected through the author's silence and the
image's own communicative power.
8 Id.
2Id.
' 114 S. Ct. at 1175-77.
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work. And yet, appropriation practices, which are based on the
idea that fundamental perceptions of everyday society can only
be disrupted by recontextualizing these images in toto, lead
artists to abstain from adding stylistic marks to their pieces or
altering original images in order to effectively transform their
original meanings.3 Thus, for adequate artist protection, the
" Ames, supra note 5, at 1482.
For appropriation to function, the artist must take an image that already
exists as a recognizable part of collective culture, challenging ideas about
ownership and originality in the process. If the artist were to create her
own original piece in the style of the sort of work she was interested in
appropriating, and then create a secondary work based on that piece, she
would not have appropriated that image because she would not have
performed the crucial act of "seeing" the image and its meaning different-
ly than its creator or its previous viewers did. The critical effect of the
translation of one person's work into the next person's would be lost.
Id. The theory behind appropriation is similar to the musical goals of digital
sampling, where replication of an original piece juxtaposed with new material
builds new works because both attempt to achieve the same transevaluation of
original material. Also like appropriationism, sampling serves to express musically
the same critical commentary on the songwriter's enviroment as appropriationism
does in the visual arts. Ames, supra note 5, at 1483. The medium of digital sam-
pling, however most often takes less from an original work than a visual artist.
Steven R. Gordon & Charles J. Sanders, The Rap on Sampling: Theft, Innovation,
or What?, in ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 207 (1989);
Jeffrey H. Brown, Comment, "They Don't Make Music the Way They Used To" The
Legal Implications of "Sampling" in Contemporary Music, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1941.
In fact, sampling has been compared to an explication of quoted material in a
literary work. Ames, supra note 5, at 1483. For a discussion on the difference be-
tween appropriationist techniques and literary explications of quoted material, see
supra note 27. Thus, because it can affect its goal with less material from an
original song, musical sampling does not challenge current copyright laws in the
same way as visual appropriation.
A more accurate musical equivalent to visual appropriation is John Oswald's
Plunderphonics, music that is made by appropriating the entirety of existing songs
and altering the form of the source material to challenge the ways in which audi-
ences listen to music:
Oswald has used a variety of tools and techniques from archaic to futur-
istic: he varies the speed of the turntable, slices up analog tape, builds
an "imaginary orchestra" in which each virtual musician plays only one
note (klangfarbenprobe); builds a jazz quartet from four separate and
unrelated solo performances; presents ambiguous information to a com-
puter; loads fragments of the Beatles' 'Birthday" into a sampling key-
board; instructs live musicians to play along with an Elvis Presley re-
cord, instructs other musicians to play along with those tracks, then
wild-tracks the once removed tracks on top of an edited version of the
Presley cut without the intermediary material. And so on.
David Gans, Michael Jackson's Face, WIRED, Feb. 1995, at 138. Unlike ordinary
digital sampling that incorporates pieces of others' recording to build new works,
Plunderphonics borrow whole pieces of music (expressly acknowledging the appro-
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elimination of indicia of authorship and the routine of whole-
sale incorporation necessitate a broad and flexible interpreta-
tion of transformative value.
When the Supreme Court sought to protect commercial
parodies by expanding the possibilities for fair commercial
criticism, however, it saved no ostensible place in transforma-
tive value for appropriation. Although appropriation shares
certain characteristics with parody, these genres are actually
quite diffe-ent. Courts and commentators often have merged
the two improperly." Traditionally parody has been under-
stood as a literary form based in satire where the parodist
comments humorously and critically on a specific work through
imitation." Parody "transforms all or a significant part of an
original work of authorship into a derivative work by distorting
or closely imitating it, for comic effect, in a manner such that
both the original work of authorship and the independent ef-
fort of the parodist are recognizable." 4 By way of replicating
the original, a parody exposes the original work's flaws.3
Characteristically, such exposure arises through humor where
the original, typically serious work is made ridiculous through
"mocking imitation."6 While courts refrain from evaluating
priation and crediting these sources on the liner notes of the CD) and, like appro-
priation in the visual arts, makes explicit to the audience elements in source ma-
terial that are "often ignored or obscured in the highly derivative world of mass-
marketed culture." Id. at 137. Oswald's musical adjustments are essentially the
very recontextualizations that signs and symbols undergo once they are presented
in galleries and museums.
' Smith, supra note 7, at 1233; see also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
"Beth W. Van Hecke, Note, But Seriously, Folks: Toward a Coherent Stan-
dard of Parody as Fair Use, 77 MINN. L. REV. 465 (1992). Although both parody
and satire ridicule their targets, parody differs from satire, as well as burlesque
and irony, because it uses the act of imitation to effect its criticism. Id. at 465
n.1.
34 Melanie A. Clemmons, Author v. Parodist: Striking a Compromise, 46 OHIO
ST. L.J. 3, 12 (1985) (arguing that an inadequate understanding of the principles
and dynamics of parody has led courts reviewing copyright claims to overempha-
size the significance of the parody's economic harm to the original author and to
create new and varied fair use considerations, resulting in reactive and inconsis-
tent case law).
11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 257 (2d ed. 1989) (defining parody as "imi-
tation of a work more or less closely modelled on the original, but so turned as to
produce a ridiculous effect"). The roots of parody exist in the Greek parodeia,
defined as "a song sung alongside another." 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNIcA 768 (15th
ed. 1975).
" Ames, supra note 5, at 1501 (quoting Sheldon N. Light, Parody, Burlesque,
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the parodic work,37 the success of the parody often is mea-
sured by whether the work achieves the intended purpose of
provoking laughter."
Unlike appropriation, parody's distinguishing characteris-
tics contribute to the ultimate aesthetic and legal success of
these works. To be effective, the parody's audience must recog-
nize both the subject of the parody and its satirical additions.
In Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court defined a parodist's claim to
fair use of existing material as "the use of some elements of a
prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in
part, comments on that author's works."39 Thus, although a
parody, by definition, must mimic an original, it must also
criticize the original to justify the intentional replication so
that an audience is alerted that the parody is a new and sepa-
rate work." The simultaneous and contradictory purpose of
parody is to target the original work for satire and thus invoke
the original, while simultaneously investing new meaning in
the original through humor or criticism.4 This kind of dual
and the Economic Rationale for Copyright, 11 CONN. L. REV. 615, 616 (1979)).
' See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to consti-
tute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits."). Despite Justice Holmes's statement in Bleistein, a court's
attitude towards the parody at issue often will determine whether the infringing
use will be tolerated upon review of the fair use factors. In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,
677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs copyrighted
song Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy was infringed by defendant's parodic song Cunni-
lingus Champion of Company C, which was performed in the show Let My People
Come--A Sexual Musical. The Court found that defendant's song did not filfill the
necessary requirements of a parody, but the court used a superficial analysis to
conclude that since the plaintiff and defendant were both "in the entertainment
field," the poorly constructed parody harmed the original's market. Id. at 185.
Encapsulating its distaste, the Second Circuit commented: "We are not prepared to
hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a competitor's copyrighted song,
substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform it for commercial gain and then escape
liability by calling the end result a parody or satire on the mores of society." Id.
For other illustrations of how judicial aversion often determines the course of a
fair use review, see Van Hecke, supra note 33, at 481-84; see also Ames, supra
note 5, at 1501. For a critical assessment of judicial consideration of the content
of a parody in the area of trademark law, see Robert N. Kravitz, Trademark,
Speech and the "Gay Olympics" Case, 69 B.U. L. REV. 131 (1989).
1 Ames, supra note 5, at 1501.
" 114 S. Ct. at 1172.
4D Id.
41 Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 886 F.2d 490,
494 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that parody of plaintiffs student summaries did not in-
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identification of both the original source and secondary work,
combined with a parody's comedic effect, determines, not only
the artistic success of the parody, but its acceptance under
law.4
2
Taking into account the dual purpose of parody, courts
have recognized that the parodist must take a certain portion
of an original to effectively "conjure up" the target of criticism
and commentary." The Supreme Court has held that in gen-
fringe plaintiffs trademark).
As the Second Circuit stated: "a parody must convey ... that it is the origi-
nal, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody. To the extent
that it does only the former but not the latter, it is not only a poor parody but
also vulnerable under . . . law." Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494.
' See, e.g., Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1964) (hold-
ing that defendant's parodic transformations of plaintiffs songs (for example, turn-
ing A Pretty Girl Is Like a Melody into Louella Schwartz Describes Her Malady)
were not a "passing off' of the original since "brief phrases of original lyrics were
(only) occasionally injected into the parodies"), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964);
Columbia Pictures Corp. v. NBC, 137 F. Supp. 348, 351 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (holding
that Sid Caesar's parody of From Here to Eternity took only that amount "suffi-
cient to cause the viewer to recall and conjure up the original"); Loew's, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (holding that per-
missible latitude to recall or conjure up plaintiffs original was grossly exceeded),
affd sub. nom., Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956) (per curiam),
affd by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); see also Fisher v. Dees, 794
F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986); Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983); MCA,
Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981); Elsmere Music v. NBC, 623 F.2d
252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1980); Walt Dis-
ney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132
(1979); Tin Pan Apple v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031
(N.D. Ga. 1986).
The extent of replication was limited, however. In Air Pirates, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a comic book publisher's parody of Walt Disney's Mickey Mouse
character was an unfair use because defendant took more from the original Disney
character than was necessary to conjure up the copyrighted work. Air Pirates, 581
F.2d at 757-58. The court ruled that a parodist should be limited to borrowing
only as much as is necessary to conjure up and satirize the original work. Id. at
758. Given Mickey Mouse's widespread popularity and given the parodist's narrow
goal of satirizing Mickey's innocent personality, the court determined that the
defendant only needed a little of the original to achieve its purpose. Id. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant's substantial use of the copyrighted
character had no other purpose than to "track Disney's work as a whole as closely
as possible," and ultimately purloin the original. Id.
Fisher v. Dees held that, given the relative difficulty of parodying musical
works, a musical parodist has some license to develop a "closer" parody of the
original song. 794 F.2d at 439; see also Elsmere, 623 F.2d at 253 n.1. This leeway
to appropriate more than a fleeting evocation of the original was qualified, howev-
er. In Elsmere, the Second Circuit noted that more extensive use would only be
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eral copying the "heart" of or the essence of a work militates
against a finding of fair use4" and that "the more substantial
the appropriation from the copyrighted work, the less likely
fair use will be considered a defense." 5 In addition, the Court
has required that the original be, at least in part, the target of
the parody,46 and that the parody "contribute[ I something
new for humorous effect or commentary."7 Even if these con-
ditions are met, however, the parody still may not use so much
of the original that it becomes substantially similar and com-
petes with the copyrighted work. 8 Essentially, the parody
must not only distinguish itself from the original target by
borrowing copyrighted material in a critical, productive or
transformative way, but also must not impinge on copyright's
creative incentives to the original's owner without justifica-
tion.4
9
While some forms of appropriation art and parody serve
the same critical function, these two modes of criticism com-
prise different genres. Although each "re-uses" existing works,
they differ in their intended purpose and form of commentary.
The most fundamental difference is that appropriation employs
allegory while parody uses humor. Though the act of appropri-
fair if the parody builds on the original by, at the very least, using the primary
work as a "known element of modern culture ... [to] contribut[e] something new
for humorous effect or commentary." 623 F.2d at 253 n.1. In Fisher, the Ninth
Circuit limited the musical parodist's license to copy by holding that the parodist's
desire to perfectly parody the original should be balanced against the copyright
owner's right to its original expression. 794 F.2d at 439.
'4 Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1985);
accord Sainger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 890 (1987); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626
F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980).
45 Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1179
(W.D.N.Y. 1982).
"5 Koons, 960 F.2d at 310.
4' Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1176.
'5 Warner Bros., 654 F.2d at 211.
41 Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (stat-
ing that 'the fact that a substantial portion of the infringing work was copied
verbatim is evidence of the qualitative value of the copied material, both to the
originator and to the plagiarist who seeks to profit from marketing someone's
else's copyrighted expression"); see also Leval, supra note 2, at 1112. But see
Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(stating that liability should not be imposed on a work that incorporates the ex-
pression of another even if the use impinges upon the market of the original but
conveys fair criticism of the appropriated excerpt).
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ation often may give a humorous effect, an appropriationist's
intention is not to be funny, but rather to communicate serious
and critical messages by recontextualizing otherwise familiar
images." Further, unlike parody, an allegorical piece does not
require identification of source and artistic authorship to be
effective.5' The act of appropriation creates new meanings in
original images by creating new contexts and by deliberately
erasing all signatures of authorship. In contrast, a parody
inevitably must reveal itself as a separate and secondary enti-
ty to its target as all parodies possess the demarcations of
their authors.
Appropriation, which has been called "parasitic,"52 does
not share a secondary relation to its original target like that
found in parody.53 John Carlin illustrates this point:
[wihereas parody is a degraded version, dependent almost entirely
on its source for its significance, appropriation is, by design, the
conceptual equal of its source. Appropriation transcends parody
because it is a well-grounded and conscious attack on traditional
notions of originality and authorship in art. Appropriation is one of
the most important conceptual strategies in late twentieth-century
art because it underscores the role of the artist as the manipulator
or modifier of existing material, rather than as the inventor or cre-
ator of new forms."
This conceptual equality between the appropriated piece and
the original causes legal dangers for contemporary artists
when courts collapse an allegorical use into parody.5 Once
' Ames, supra note 5, at 1501.
, Carlin, supra note 14, at 129 n.106.
Carlin, supra note 14, at 125.
Carlin, supra note 14, at 129 n.106.
Carlin, supra note 14, at 129 n.106 (emphasis added). This need not be a
repudiation of copyright. Carlin's description can be seen as, and was in fact in-
tended to be, a call for copyright's modification to embrace new forms of artistic
expression.
" This problem was most apparent in Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.
1992), where the Second Circuit, although recognizing that Koons's work belonged
to a school of appropriation, ultimately found that it was not a valid use because
its message was not effectively conveyed according to parody's definition. Id. at
309-11.
Louise Harmon argues that the act of appropriation should be considered a
form of parody because the former's critical purpose mirrors the latter's ultimate
goal: "Parody of something larger than another work of art serves a much more
ambitious, critical function: to force scrutiny of our culture and values, and the
choices we have made." Louise Harmon, Law, Art and the Killing Jar, 79 IOWA L.
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the appropriationist piece fails to meet the definition of a paro-
dy, the artist may not assert copyright's fair use defense to
protect the art work as publicly useful communication and
criticism.
The requirement of conceptual equality further threatens
appropriationist techniques because appropriation intentionally
violates the basic copyright principle that only an original
work's ideas may be re-used by a subsequent creator. An alle-
gorical use requires that the entirety of its copyrighted expres-
sion be copied to convey the idea of the symbol.56 Replication
of the idea of an everyday signifier alone is insufficient since
the expression and idea of the symbol have become insepara-
ble. Thus, even though judicially created exceptions for parody
exist to allow parodists to borrow a certain amount of an
original's expression, these exceptions fail to protect an
appropriationist who must replicate a much larger portion of a
copyrighted original to convey a creative message.57
In addition to appropriationism's conflation of idea and
REV. 367, 395 (1994). Harmon's criticism of the law's treatment of appropriation
art focuses on courts' inflexibility in keeping the definition of parody narrow. Id.
at 393. This Comment argues, instead, that persuading courts to acknowledge that
the allegorical act operates independently from parody deflates the potential that
an art work on review will be misunderstood. A separate definition for appropria-
tion would reduce the likelihood that an appropriative piece will be deemed unfair
once the expectation of a standard parodic effect is imposed.
" For a more thorough discussion of copyright's idea/expression dichotomy in
relation to appropriation and allegorical replication, see infra text accompanying
notes 71-76. Due to contemporary art's infiltration into the consumer market,
appropriationists become even more vulnerable to copyright laws when an appro-
priation art work is itself multiplied or is copied on postcards, posters and t-shirts.
In these instances, the de facto rule that intellectual property infringement may
be contained by limiting the copy to a "one time use" does not save from liability
any artist who agrees to mass market her work. Under copyright law, multiple
copies of an art work compound an artist's liability because they increase the
likelihood that a court will find bad faith in the intentional replication of another's
property without seeking permission. Multiple copies also severely restrict the
availability of a fair use defense to artists absent a traditional and explicit refer-
ence to the original. See Koons, 960 F.2d at 310-11. Similarly, in trademark law,
the risk of liability from commercial reproductions arises when the appropriated
trade symbol is widely exposed to public consumers who would likely confuse the
work with the trademark's original source.
Courts determine whether a parody is a fair use by imposing a standard
that allows a parodist to take only those elements of the original that function to
recall or conjure up the original work for the efficacy of the parody. For a more
thorough discussion of the "conjure up" test, see supra notes 43-49 and accompany-
ing text.
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expression, the third prong of the fair use test-the amount
and substantiality of the use-creates an additional hurdle
to fair use acceptance. Under a fair use inquiry, judicially
created exceptions that allow a parodist to use more of an
original than ordinarily permitted do not aid appropriationists
in defending their work. In fact, if courts reviewing
appropriationist claims look for parodic instead of allegorical
elements, the work is likely to be considered beyond the scope
of parody and more detrimentally a taking performed in bad
faith.59
II. BACKGROUND OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Copyright's Purpose: A Delicate Equilibrium
The owner of copyright for an original image possesses a
proprietary interest in the intangible value of the work's ex-
pression. This proprietary interest is of an intellectual nature
and, therefore, is subject to regulations. Copyright law at-
tempts the elusive task of protecting an owner whose property,
although never "consumed by use," would decrease in value if
exploited by illicit copying.60 To encourage future creations for
the public interest, copyright law grants an author exclusive
rights of ownership6' and protects an owner's economic inter-
ests by containing any use-whether strictly commercial or
17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988).
' See Koons, 960 F.2d at 971; see also Loew's, Inc. v. CBS, 131 F. Supp. 165,
181 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
11 See Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, PHIL. & PUB. AFF.,
Winter 1988, at 31-52 ("[Intellectual objects] are non-exclusive: they can be at
many places at once and are not consumed by their use. ... The possession or
use of an intellectual object by one person does not preclude others from possess-
ing or using it as well.").
61 This stands in stark contrast to trademark law in which the primary motive
is to ensure that a mark's commercial language is protected for the sake of the
owner's investment in the symbol or slogan. Thus, trademark and copyright law
diverge in the focus that each places on commercial uses. Since trademark law
serves to guard a mark's efficacy to communicate within a commercial dialogue, it
may only regulate injurious and unauthorized commercial uses. Trademark rights
do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark by another
who is communicating ideas or expressing points of view. Tyrone Tasker, Parody
or Satire as a Defense to Trademark Infringement, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 216, 230-31
(1986).
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not-that might impede the owner's market and potential
profits. 2 By granting an author a limited monopoly over his
or her work, economic incentives ultimately encourage progress
ini the arts.63
Copyright's vigilance, however, must be balanced with the
need to keep the flow of available creative sources free for
alternative artistic use, even at the price of a copyright owner's
economic interests.64 In Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court con-
firmed this limitation on the copyright monopoly, but, to date,
this check does not prevent a chilling of appropriationist
speech. Because copyright law has failed to devise a mecha-
nism by which to understand their work, appropriationists risk
its violation. Copyright law misunderstands or ignores
appropriationism's artistic purpose when it ultimately deems it
' See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In
Sony, the Court stated that in light of copyright's intention to provide economic
incentives to authors, whether the copied use is itself commercial or noncommer-
cial should not determine whether the use will be deemed fair. Rather, the deter-
minative inquiry should be whether the use will impinge upon the author's mar-
ket. 'Te purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. Even copy-
ing for noncommercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to obtain
the rewards that Congress intended him to have. But a use that has no demon-
strable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work
need not be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to create. The
prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to ideas with-
out any countervailing benefit." Id. at 450-51.
The Constitution provides that "The Congress shall have power ... To pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & cl. 8. Although the underpinnings of
such a limited monopoly include the Lockean argument of labor justifica-
tion-where one is deserving of the fruits of one's labor since one owns the body
with which such fruits were cultivated-the predominant argument is one of social
utility. Given the utilitarian justification for section eight, perhaps the most logical
basis for copyright is that the greater good of publicly available intellectual prod-
ucts justifies providing incentives to individual creators to supply these goods.
Lacking such incentives, authors would have no reason to sacrifice their time,
energy and money to create these products. Hettinger, supra note 60, at 33.
"' Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1178; see also Zechariah Chafee Jr., Reflections on
the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511 (1945) ("The world goes ahead
because each of us builds on the work of our predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on
the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself.' Progress would be
stifled if an author had a complete monopoly on everything in his book."); Emer-
son v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (C.CD. Mass. 1845); Carey v.
Kearsley, 4 Esp. 170, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K.B. 1803) ("while I shall think my-
self bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of his copyright, one must not
put manacles upon science").
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nothing more than a commercial use.65 A fair, consistent and
practical definition of appropriatist allegory, combined with a
workable approach to separating such artistic objectives from
commercial interests, is essential to its survival.
B. Limits On Copyright Monopoly: The Idea/Expression
Dichotomy
Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act enumerates the five
exclusive rights granted to copyright holders.66 The owner's
" Courts have found plainly commercial works to be fair use. Twin Peaks
Prods., v. Publications Int'l, 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Consumers Union
v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983)) (holding that adver-
tisement incorporating Consumer Reports recommendation was a fair use), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984); Warner Bros. Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir.
1983) (holding television series that parodied Superman a fair use); Elsmere Mu-
sic, Inc. v. NBC, 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) (Saturday Night Live skit
parodying the song, I Love New York, held to be fair use); Berlin v. E.C. Publica-
tions, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544-45 (2d Cir.) (holding that Mad Magazine parody of
Irving Berlin songs was a fair use), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). In contrast,
some courts have argued that an advertising use, due to its commercial nature, is
never a "proper purpose" under § 107 of the Copyright Act in terms of its critical
or educational value. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1046 (Oakes, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing in banc). The label of "commercial exploitation" seems to
be used by courts to indicate that a commercial use has infringed upon the
plaintiffs own right to capitalize on her work through reproductions or derivative
uses. It is difficult, however, to distinguish the above-cited, permissively commer-
cial cases from other uses found by courts to be commercially exploitive. Compare
Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. ABC, 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding network telecast using clips of wrestler film was "commercial exploita-
tion"); and Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) (publication
incorporating Rosenberg letters could constitute "commercial exploitation"), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); with Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d
1429 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that "[i]t is the blatantly commercial purpose of the
derivative work that prevents this parody from being a fair use"), rev'd, 114 S. Ct.
1164 (1994). Upon close comparison, it seems that those uses, which the Circuit
found publicly useful, either because the information appropriated needed to be
publicly disclosed or because the parody at issue was socially valuable, were al-
lowed the fair use privilege despite their commercial characteristics. Those uses
deemed "commercially exploitive" were labeled as such because the defendants'
works did not seem publicly valuable to the court, not because the uses were, in
fact, any more commercially abusive than a permissible commercial use.
Section 106 lists the following rights:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distrib-
ute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending, (4) in the
case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
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right to reproduce her work and the right to make derivative
copies are the two statutory rights with the greatest impact on
appropriationist artists. 7 These rights of authorship are not
absolute, as the Act allows for some creative borrowing. The
Copyright Act imposes specific requirements on a copyright
owner who brings an action to enjoin infringing uses or for
damages.6' These restrictions function to limit the duration of
copyright ownership," require copied portions of a work to
bear a substantial similarity to the original, extend protection
only to a work's expression, and exclude copies deemed to be
fair use.0 However, three of these four limitations-the
idea/expression dichotomy, the requirement of substantial
similarity, and the exception of fair uses-allow a copyright
holder to enjoin an appropriationist's work, thereby discourag-
ing other artists from experimenting with innovative modes of
expression.
The idea/expression dichotomy, which states that a copy-
right holder only may limit subsequent use of the expression
and not the holder's ideas, does not save appropriationists who
creatively communicate by recontextualizing the totality of
another's expression, from liability. A copyright holder's mo-
nopoly is limited primarily by the tenet that only a work's ex-
pression may be protected. Because ideas must remain free for
future public use, a person may not restrict their alternative
uses. Expression, on the other hand, bears the original and
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly; and (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic,
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptur-
al works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
Greenberg, supra note 24, at 23.
17 U.S.C. §§ 501-510 provide entitlements and remedies to owners whose
copyrights have been infringed. A copyright holder would potentially have the
right, under §§ 502 through 509, to enjoin an appropriationist's work, impound
and dispose of copies of the work, receive actual and statutory damages and prof-
its resulting from the infringement, as well as costs of litigation and attorney's
fees, and bring criminal charges against the artist. Section 506 is particularly
onerous for appropriationists since subsection (a) specifically delineates wilful in-
fringement for purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain as the prerequi-
site elements of the criminal offense. For a more detailed discussion on copyright
remedies against appropriationist uses, see Carlin, supra note 14, at 111-13.
' 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305.
Van Hecke, supra note 33, at 468-70.
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individual mark of its author and so deserves the economic
ownership that protection affords. The distinction between idea
and expression has led one court to comment that "[tihe 'mar-
ket place of ideas' is not limited by copyright because copyright
is limited to protection of expression."'
Yet, appropriation art undermines the validity of this
argument. Since the allegorical process entails appropriating
the entirety of a copyrighted image's expression, copyright law
presently limits the intellectual market place by stifling signifi-
cant ideas that contemporary art seeks to communicate. In
pictorial works, the idea in the work, or its "iconographic con-
tent,"72 is free for use since such thematic elements reoccur in
many works and are part of the public realm.73 For appropria-
tionists, however, the idea projected by the appropriated image
is conveyed effectively only when the totality of the image's
expression is exactly replicated. Thus, appropriationism re-
quires merging elements of idea and expression."4 The danger
of this conflation is that, because for allegory "the mode of
expression is essential to the idea expressed,"7
appropriationist art creates a prima facie case of infringement.
In allegory, both access to the original and substantial similar-
ity are established easily.76
11 Sid & Marty Kroflt Television Prods. v. McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1170 (9th Cir. 1977).
72 Krieg, supra note 7, at 1570 n.27 (quoting E. PANOFSKY, MEANING IN THE
VIsuAL ARTS 26-30 (1955) (defining iconographic content as "the subject matter or
theme of a work as opposed to its form")).
7' Krieg, supra note 7, at 1570.
U Krieg, supra note 7, at 1571 ("The artist incorporates the appropriated work
into a separate expressive form that is dependent upon, but not limited by, its
past mode of expression. The resulting product is not a mere copy, which we may
legitimately prohibit, but an entirely new expression which the law should serve to
protect."). Nimner has maintained that the idea/expression dichotomy is ineffective
in the field of visual work. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 203
(1989).
" Krieg, supra note 7, at 1573.
7' Greenberg, supra note 24, at 25. Determining substantial similarity in the
area of allegorical appropriation would not be a disputed factual issue for a court
since the appropriationist act entails literal and wilful replication. In such an
instance, a court immediately could find that an appropriationist had copied an
original's expression and move directly to a fair use inquiry. See, e.g., Koons, 960
F.2d at 307.
We agree that no reasonable juror could find that copying did not occur
in this case. First, this case presents the rare scenario where there is
direct evidence of copying. Koons admittedly gave a copy of the
[Vol. 60: 1653
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III. THE FAIR USE DEFENSE
Given copyright's inherent restrictions on appropriationist
techniques as a result of the idea/expression dichotomy and the
standard of substantial similarity, the fair use defense pro-
vides one of the only protections for appropriationists against
copyright claims." In fact when Congress created Section 107
to codify the fair use exception, it deliberately included the
kind of flexibility in application necessary to promote progress
[plaintiffs] photograph to the Italian artisans with the explicit instruction
that the work be copied.... [Further, even were such direct evidence of
copying unavailable, the district court's decision could be upheld in this
case on the basis that defendant Koons' access to the copyrighted work is
conceded, and the accused work is so substantially similar to the copy-
righted work that reasonable jurors could not differ on this issue.
Id. Ordinarily, a review of a copy's substantial similarity to the original requires
tests such as that of "abstraction" or "pattern," expression versus idea, and total
look and feel. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880); Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc.
v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1959); Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
" It has been proposed that, rather than attempt to fit appropriation within
fair use, a kind of compulsory licensing scheme, similar to § 115 in the area of
phonorecords and premised on the "takings clause" of the Fifth Amendment, could
be implemented legislatively that would avoid the difficult task under a fair use
review of judicial differentiation between an appropriationist replication and illicit
copying. With such a provision in place, the appropriationist artist would pay a
statutorily determined fee, but would not have to rely on the original author's
permission. Hamilton, supra note 8, at 115; see also Meeker, supra note 8, at 233.
While this may be a good alternative, challenges of implementation exist regarding
monitoring and administrative costs. Although section 115 was enacted by Con-
gress to alleviate "monopolistic control of music for recording purposes," Meeker,
supra note 8, at 233, the provision, with specific requirements of thirty-day notice
to the Copyright Office and a penalty that precludes the opportunity to obtain a
license if notice is not given, is rarely ever used. Nearly all licenses that are is-
sued to secondary users are based upon the business rules and contracts of music
publishing companies or agencies that control license issuance and royalty collec-
tion of their publisher principals. Thus, even if Congress implemented a statutory
compulsory licensing scheme for the visual arts, it is possible that the law would
be rendered useless, and that, instead, corporate rules and practices would police
appropriative works. This scheme could also prove to be expensive since obliga-
tions of payment in hiring an agency or creating a company to monitor and collect
fees would ultimately fall on the artist. Although the "takings clause" proposal
may be a viable alternative, this Comment argues that such appropriative works
would best be reviewed under a fair use test because careful case-by-case judicial
review will prompt courts to take advantage of the flexibility of the fair use fac-
tors to arrive at an equitable holding under the circumstances of each creative
use. This approach would also eliminate financial and administrative costs, as well
as problems of statutory obsolescence reflected in section 115.
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in the arts.78 The Supreme Court has confirmed such codified
flexibility by stating that fair use is "an 'equitable rule of rea-
son,' which 'permits courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very
creativity which that law is designed to foster."' 79
Section 107's flexibility results from the fact that rather
than provide a strict definition of a fair use, its preamble mere-
ly lists examples of uses that courts may consider fair.8" The
list of fair uses is quite broad and generally the examples pro-
vided are characteristically productive ones endowing benefits
to the public. The plain language of the statute reveals that
general appropriative uses that serve as criticism or comment
may fit the fair use exemption. Thus, even uses not mentioned
by Congress may be deemed fair. A final finding of fair use
depends, hoivever, upon the application of four determinative
factors:"'
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is for a commercial or nonprofit purposes; (2) the nature of the copy-
righted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
relative to the copyrighted work as a whole; (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.!2
Congress provided these factors to guide courts making fair
78 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975). The legislative reports provide: "The statement of
the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guidance to users in determining
when the principles of the doctrine apply. However, the endless variety of situa-
tions and combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cases pre-
cludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute." Id.
" Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984)).
The preamble reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purpos-
es such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multi-
ple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment of copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
81 S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975) ("[W]hether a use re-
ferred to in the first sentence of section 107' is a fair use in a particular case will
depend upon the application of the determinative factors, including those men-
tioned in the second sentence.").
' The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use
if such a finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 17 U.S.C. §
107.
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use findings. Courts also may look to additional factors not
listed specifically in the statute." Nevertheless, a court
typically will not consider an appropriationist work that is
considered criticism or comment under Section 107's preamble
fair use unless it meets the four statutory conditions.84
Upon finding that a work's purpose fulfills the preamble,
however, a court should not apply Congress's list as a strict
and rigid formula. Justice Story described the essential pur-
pose of the fair use test as one that requires courts to 'look to
the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use
may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede
the objects, of the original work."85 For a fair use analysis to
be effective, courts must compare the degree of intrusion upon
an artist's incentive to produce the original work with the
public contribution the appropriationist work makes as criti-
cism or comment. The four statutory factors should not operate
as a checklist by which only the secondary work's commercial
aspects are weighed against its critical purpose. Rather, the
factors should guide courts as they thoroughly explore the
critical merit of the piece, including the purpose of each specif-
ic use of the copyrighted expression," and the contribution,
H.R. REP. No. 102-836, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1992) (stating that the
intent behind the phrase "all the above factors" was to "encompass the terms
'including' and 'such as' embodied in the preamble to Section 107, terms that are
defined in Section 101 of title 17 as being 'illustrative and not limitative.' Thus,
for unpublished works as for all other copyrighted works, the courts must consider
all four statutory factors, but they may, at their discretion, consider any other
factors they deem relevant." (emphasis added)).
In Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court most recently confirmed that uses, such as
parodies, mentioned in the preamble do not warrant presumptive findings of fair
use. 114 S. Ct. at 1174. Earlier, the Court in Harper & Row v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539 (1985), specifically rejected the notion that defendant's purpose of
news reporting and fulfillment of one of § 107's illustrative examples created a
presumption of fair use where the first fair use factor could automatically weigh
in the magazine's favor. The Court in Harper & Row stated: 'the examples enu-
merated in § 107 ... give some idea of the sort of activities the courts might
regard as fair use under the circumstances. This listing was not intended to be
exhaustive, or to single out any particular use as presumptively a 'fair' use....
The fact that an article arguably is 'news' and therefore a productive use is sim-
ply one factor in a fair use analysis." Id. at 561.
' Leval, supra note 2, at 1105 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).
" Leval, supra note 2, at 1112 ("Courts must consider the question of fair use
for each challenged passage and not merely for the secondary work overall. ...
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either visually or effectually, the piece makes through its repli-
cation of the copyrighted image.
In contrast to Justice Story's encapsulation of fair use, two
leading Supreme Court cases before Acuff-Rose--Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal Studios, Inc.87 and Harper & Row v. Na-
tion Enterprises -- subsequently had been interpreted im-
properly to narrow § 107 to such a degree that a secondary
work's existence on the market often determined the success of
an infringement claim. Since these cases involved strict, non-
creative commercial copying and the first-time news publica-
tion of literature, they contributed little to exploring the artis-
tic function of a secondary work that existed beyond its com-
mercial character. However, in response to Sony and Harper &
Row, lower courts had reduced what should have constituted a
multi-dimensional discussion of parody claims to one basic
inquiry: the commercial nature of the work. 9
Traditionally the fair use defense has been an exception to
a copyright owner's creative monopoly. In fact, the Copyright
Act does not preclude a fair use determination in a commercial
context. Yet in general both Harper & Row and Sony made the
burden of proving fair use much harder to meet once a use's
commercial purpose was established." Two of the four fair
use factors take the commercial aspects of the copy into ac-
count: the first, the purpose and character of the use, and the
fourth, the effect of the use upon the potential market or value
of the copyrighted work.9 Although the Court weighed these
Simply to appraise the overall character of the challenged work tells little about
whether the various quotations of the original author's writings have a fair use
purpose or merely supersede.").
8' 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
See William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit,
Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 677 (1993).
" See Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 ("A commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the
owner of the copyright."); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (declaring
the fourth factor "'the most important, and indeed, central fair use factor" (quot-
ing 3 NIMMER, supra note 74, § 13.05[A], at 13-81); Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (WM). Ga.
1986) ("In other infringement cases, the commercial nature of the use has been
found . . . to be 'especially significant, if not determinative' and 'militates quite
strongly against a finding of fair use.'").
" See supra text accompanying note 82 (listing four factors).
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factors heavily in its fair use determinations, ultimately the
copy's effect on the owner's potential market determined the
success of the secondary user's defense. 2
In Sony, the Supreme Court reviewed the noncommercial
nature of using betamax recordings of television programs for
private home viewing. The Court found that unless a use is a
nonprofit activity, every commercial appropriation of copyright-
ed material is presumptively unfair. 3 What this "Sony pre-
sumption" required of the plaintiff in proving a detrimental
economic effect-the fourth fair use factor-was a showing by a
mere preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful
likelihood of future harm existed. 4 Easing the plaintiffs task
of meeting this low burden of proof, the Court expressly pro-
vided that even if the plaintiff lacked evidence of potential
harm, such a likelihood would be presumed if the defendant's
use was for commercial gain.95 Once courts applied this pre-
sumption to parody claims, the likelihood of a defendant's
success decreased significantly despite the secondary work's ar-
tistic or critical value, if the parody shared in certain commer-
cial characteristics. In these instances, both the first and
fourth fair use factor weighed heavily against the parodist.
Even more onerous to commercial parodies was the possibility
that a court would equate a parodist's deliberate act of copying
with an intention to commercially exploit the original. This
equation would eclipse a fair use defense altogether, even if
the use had not harmed the plaintiffs market. 6
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568-70; Sony, 464 U.S. at 451-53.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 449.
" Id. at 451.
5 Id.
" Two district court decisions that dealt with commercial uses in the area of
parody reveal the ease with which courts find commercial exploitation. Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1036
(N.D. Ga. 1986), held that defendant's parody of Cabbage Patch Dolls on commer-
cially distributed sticker-cards was not a fair use and granted plaintiffs motion to
enjoin the cards. The court found that the defendant's use was not a parody that
merited a fair use defense since "the primary purpose behind defendant's parody
[was] not an effort to make a social comment but [was] an attempt to make mon-
ey," and "[tihe basic concept behind the defendant's stickers is aimed at capitaliz-
ing on the Cabbage Patch craze." Id. at 1034. Thus, equipped with a finding of
bad faith and, in the absence of any meaningful analysis of the plaintiffs market
harm, the court held for the plaintiff. Id. at 1040.
Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
followed Original Appalachian Artwork's reasoning when it held that defendant's
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The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Sony commercial pre-
sumption in Harper & Row. In that case, Harper & Row sued
the Nation for publishing the "heart" of Gerald Ford's unpub-
lished manuscript. The Court held that, despite the story's
newsworthiness and public utility, the Nation had supplanted
Harper & Row's commercially valuable right of first publica-
tion and thus was subject to a Sony presumption.97 The Court
rejected the defendant's argument that because the quotations
had not been published for purely commercial reasons, they
were not strictly of a commercial nature." Rather, the Court
found that, in seeking to "scoop" the forthcoming publication,
"the Nation's use had not merely the incidental effect but the
intended purpose of supplanting the copyright holder's commer-
cially valuable right of first publication."9' Capturing the es-
sence of commercial disadvantage to the copyright owner, the
Supreme Court stated that a finding of commercial use arises
not when "the sole motive of the use is monetary gain, but
[when] the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copy-
righted material without paying the customary price." 00
beer commercial, which parodied the rap group Fat Boys, infringed plaintiffs copy-
right. Id. at 833. On concluding that the use did not constitute a parody, the
court rejected Miller Brewing Co.'s fair use defense on the ground that "the
commercial's use was entirely for profit: to sell beer." Id. at 832. Both the Orig-
inal Appalachian Artwork and Tin Pan Apple courts concluded that the
defendants' uses were unfair not by way of a market-share analysis, but by pre-
suming that the defendants' bad faith was commercially exploitive.
" Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
93 Id.
9 Id.
100 Id. The definition of a commercial use in copyright law has varied in its
emphasis on the defendant's motivations, the kind of market harm, either actual
or potential, that the defendant's use caused the plaintiff, and the causal connec-
tion between the defendantfs use and the plaintiffs injury. Two pre-1976 Copyright
Act cases that more fully discuss commercial uses are Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett
& Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (ED. Pa. 1938) (holding that
defendant's use of excerpts from medical doctor's book in cigarette advertisement
was an unfair use since it caused actual damage to doctor's reputation by making
it appear that he voluntarily "commercialized" his scientific work, thus retarding
the work's sale) and Loew's Inc. v. CBS, 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (hold-
ing that Jack Benny's parody of the film Gaslight infringed its copyright and was
not a fair use because the parody had potential of sharing in original's market),
affd sub nom., Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd sub nom.,
CBS v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
The mere absence of competition or injurious effect upon the copyrighted
work will not make a use fair. The right of a copyright proprietor to
exclude others is absolute and if it has been violated the fact that the
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In terms of its usefulness to a parody's claim to fair use,
Harper & Row overemphasized the importance of income from
sales of a defendant's work to a copyright owner and the fi-
nancial advantage to the defendant user of free use of the
copyrighted work.'0 ' The decision failed to appreciate that a
defendant's motivations often include a conglomeration of cre-
ativity and finance. Instead, the Court focused too strictly on
the secondary user's potential profit and increased the likeli-
hood that any commercially valuable use of a copyrighted work
that lacked the owner's permission was vulnerable to a "com-
mercially exploitive" designation.' 2
Because the Supreme Court was limited to a review of the
facts in Sony and Harper & Row, it never stressed the value of'
the purely artistic or creative expression in a secondary user's
work. The Court did not provide a more detailed analysis of
the artistic intentions that lead a defendant to create a given
work and did not address issues of commercialism and sub-
stantial taking in parody until eight years later in Acuff-
Rose."°3
In Acuff-Rose, the defendant, 2 Live Crew, wrote a rap ver-
sion of Roy Orbison's and William Dees's song "Oh, Pretty
infringement will not affect the sale or exploitation of the work or pecu-
niarily damage him is immaterial.
Id. at 184. The court in Rosemont Enter. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967), provided one hopeful definition of a
commercial use by recognizing that a defendant's motivations share in both artistic
and commercial interests. Rosemont held that an unauthorized publication of
Howard Hughes's biography was a fair use since the public benefit of the
biography's information outweighed the plaintiffs interest in containing defendant's
potential profits.
Whether an author or publisher reaps economic benefits from the sale of
a biographical work, or whether its publication is motivated in part by a
desire for commercial gain, or whether it is designed for the popular
market . ..has no bearing on whether a public benefit may be derived
from such a work.... We conclude that whether an author or publisher
has a commercial motive or writes in a popular style is irrelevant to a
determination of whether a particular use of copyrighted material in a
work which offers some benefit to the public constitutes a fair use.
Id. at 307.
101 Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 89, at 683.
102 And yet, because appropriationist art, as well as conventional parodies, tend
to criticize or poke fun at the original, to require the copyright holder's permission
to use the work imposes a chill on these uses as copyright owners will seldom
allow their works to be targeted. See Van Hecke, supra note 33, at 489.
103 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
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Woman," which credited both Orbison and Dees as writers of
the original work. After the album was released, the defen-
dants requested permission to parody the Orbison hit, but the
plaintiffs refused and sued for copyright infringement. After a
district court found the work to be a fair use and the Sixth
Circuit reversed,"4 the Supreme Court unanimously held
that, despite Sony and Harper & Row's commercial definitions,
a commercial parody that possesses transformative value none-
theless may be considered a fair use of copyrighted
material.'0 5
Essentially, the Court recognized that even though a first
factor inquiry into the purpose and character of the defendant's
use must consider the work's commercial component, this com-
mercial investigation is merely one aspect of a first factor in-
quiry: "the mere fact that a use is educational and not for
profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any
more than the commercial character of use bars a finding of
fairness."" 6 In so doing, the Supreme Court prevented a com-
mercial presumption from overrunning a review of the use's
critical merits and broadened the scope of a first factor inquiry
to include the transformative value test first conceived by
Judge Pierre Leval. 7
The Court declared that transformative value is discerned
by examining "whether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the
104 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (MID. Tenn. 1991).
The district court held that the defendant's rendition of "Oh, Pretty Woman" was
a parody of the original that constituted fair use. On appeal the Sixth Circuit re-
versed and remanded the district court's finding on the ground that the lower
court erred when it characterized the defendant's use as a parody in the popular
sense, and not according to the strict legal definition. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v.
Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir. 1992). The Sixth Circuit, based on its
analysis of the character of the defendant's work under the first prong of the fair
use test, concluded that the district court placed insufficient emphasis on the com-
mand of Harper & Row. Id. Given the defendant's commercial purpose, and its
substantial taking of Orbison's song, the Sixth Circuit determined that the parody
was unfair.
100 Id. at 1177-78.
000 Id. at 1174.
10. Leval, supra note 2, at 1111. Judge Leval proposed the standard of
transformative value to clarify that fair use's purpose of protecting an original
author's market would remain intact if courts allowed secondary authors to use
copyrighted material in a manner that "adds value to the oiginal-[where] the
quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new infor-
mation, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings."
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objects' of the original creation ... or instead adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message."' Applying
this definition to the rap song, the Court found that because
the nature of 2 Live Crew's use was parodic and served to
transform the original work "by shedding light on [the original
work], and, in the process, creating a new one,""9 consider-
ations of commercialism were less likely to weigh against the
fairness of the use."'
Part of the Court's consideration of the transformative
nature of the rap song was focused on how much of the origi-
nal song was used. Addressing the third fair use factor con-
cerning the amount and substantiality of a parody's taking,
Acuff-Rose provided a reasonableness standard to identify a
parody's critical value to the original work."' The Court stat-
ed that "[tlhe threshold question when fair use is raised in de-
fense of parody is whether a parodic character may reasonably
be perceived.""' In the instant case, the Court held that the
rap song's marriage of "reference and ridicule" distinguished
the work as a parody."' Furthermore the rap song's initial
targeting of the original and subsequent satirical additions
served to make the form and content of the original work ap-
pear ridiculous, so that the secondary use bore sufficient direct
criticism of the original. By using only the amount of the origi-
nal necessary to conjure up the target to its audience," 4 the
secondary use therefore transformed "Oh, Pretty Woman" into
a new and different parodic work."5
According to the Acuff-Rose Court, applying the Sony pre-
sumption against commercial uses without questioning its
transformative value would swallow the fair use exception
because it would exclude any critical commentary created for
profit from using the defense. The Court asserted that the
Sony statement---"every commercial use of copyrighted materi-
"'s Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
109 Id.
110 Id.
1 Id. at 1175.
12 Id. at 1173.
' Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1173.
114 Id. at 1176.
5 Id. at 1177.
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al is presumptively... unfair" 6 -was not a per se rule and
should not be given dispositive weight when determining the
fair use of a parody." 7 Rather, the commercial nature of the
work should merely tend to weigh against a finding of fair
use. 1
18
In Acuff-Rose, however, the Supreme Court also held that
if a parodic transformative use is not reasonably perceived and
the amount of a secondary user's taking is substantial, a com-
mercial finding may significantly weigh against the use."9
Thus, in the area of appropriationist art, if a court finds that
an allegorical work reveals little or no physical alteration of
the copyrighted image and adds no explicit criticism of the
original composition, the work's commercial aspects bear in-
creased significance in a fair use determination under the first
and third fair use factors. In Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court
confirmed Harper & Row's holding that the fourth factor inqui-
ry entails consideration, not only of the extent of market harm
"caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but
also 'whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort
engaged in by the defendant.., would result in a substantial-
ly adverse impact on the potential market' for the original.""12
Further, the Court held that, although a Sony presumption or
inference of market harm could not be applied to the fourth
factor in the area of parody, the presumption should be applied
in instances of verbatim copying of the original for commercial
purposes.121
Thus, a literal reading of Acuff-Rose could render the deci-
sions a monument only to those creative uses that effect criti-
cism in the most readily apparent modes. Most onerous for
appropriationists is a court's failure to recognize their
allegorical strategy. This is because the reasonably perceived
standard hinges a successful defense on the relative obtuseness
n' Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
.. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1174.
" Id. (emphasis added).
n, Id. at 1172. "If... the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance
or style of the original composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get
attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to
fairness in borrowing another's work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish),
and other factors, like the extent of its commerciality, loom larger." Id.
12' 114 S. Ct. at 1177.
121 Id.
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or acumen of a court as the perceiver of art. As a consequence,
absent an understanding of allegorical language, the Supreme
Court's holdings in Sony and Harper & Row regarding literal
and exact duplication of copyrighted expression are likely to
create a commercial presumption against appropriation pieces
on the basis of the fourth fair use factor. The Court's opinion
indicates a belief that duplication of the entirety of the original
for commercial use would "supersede the objects of the origi-
nal" and "serve as a market replacement for it."'22 Thus, once
a court excludes an appropriationist piece from the realm of
parody, a Sony inference of market harm would allow a finding
of unfair use on the basis of the presumed harm to an original
work's actual or potential markets.
In sum, although Acuff-Rose provides better guidelines for
evaluating the critical content and public benefit of commercial
parodies, they are of limited use to works that do not clearly
fulfill a court's traditional parodic expectations. Expanding the
scope of inquiry under the first fair use factor to include re-
viewing a work's transformative value, apart from its commer-
cial purpose, may very well save commercial parodies from an
automatic commercial presumption. However, the Supreme
Court's insistence that a secondary use must physically alter or
add stylistic marks to the original piece to be considered truly
transformative drastically limits alternative creative criticism
and commentary that should also be eligible under fair use.
IV. THE EXCLUSION OF APPROPRIATION ART FROM ACUFF-
ROSE: APPLYING THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS TO
ROGERS V. KooNs
Juxtaposing Acuff-Rose's findings with the facts and opin-
ion of the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Koons illustrates the
legal hazards for appropriation artists that still remain despite
the Supreme Court's holding. Koons involved the issue of copy-
right infringement in the defendant's sculpture entitled String
of Puppies."2 Jeff Koons had appropriated a black and white
photograph by Art Rogers, which depicted a couple seated on a
park bench surrounded by eight puppies. Koons had instructed
122 Id.
"' Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
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his artisans to copy the image in the photograph in the form of
a sculpture. The subsequent work was exhibited in a New York
exhibition entitled, The Banality Show. The appropriationist
work was comprised of a newly clown-faced couple ecstatically
embracing eight blue puppies. The sculpture, constructed from
polychrome and wood, altered not only the medium and size of,
the original photo, but changed the entire feel of the original
image. In the style of many appropriation artists, Koons used
the banal or universal aspects of the photo to emphasize its
generic significance, or insignificance, as kitsch.'24
When Koons attempted to insulate himself from Rogers's
copyright suit by claiming that the sculpture was a parody of
the original, the court denied him the fair use defense because
it found that Koons's work fell drastically short of the
definitional requirements of a parody.'" Further, the court
found that Koons's sculpture had used the entirety of the
photograph's expression to pass off the image as his own and
exploit it for profit.'26 The Second Circuit held that, because
the piece and its reproductions were sold for profit, the use
was presumptively unfair and impinged upon Rogers's poten-
tial market in bad faith.
Strikingly similar to the reasonably perceived standard ap-
plied in Acuff-Rose, the Second Circuit in Koons asserted that
a parody of a copyrighted work is permitted only if it is self-
evident to the viewer.' 2' Upon a brief assessment of the criti-
cal nature of the sculpture, the court concluded that, not only
was the appropriation unsuccessful as a parody, but that it
was not a parody at all.1 29 Finding that the work utterly
lacked any traditional satirical connection or secondary rela-
tion to the photograph, the court further interpreted the ab-
sence of an explicit reference as proof that Koons's appropria-
tion attempted to portray the original as his own. The court
thus concluded that the work was barren of all critical insight
"2 For a side-by-side view of the Rogers's photograph and a photograph of
Koons's sculpture, see Willajeane F. McLean, All's Not Fair in Art and War: A
Look at the Fair Use Defense after Rogers v. Koons, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 373 (1993).
" Koons, 960 F.2d at 310.
12 Id. at 308.
'27 Id. at 312.
"8 Id. at 310.
129 Id.
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and the result of wilful plagiarism."'
The Acuff-Rose decision did not correct this sort of judicial
misunderstanding. Despite the fact that the first factor of the
fair use defense provides for critical exploration of the second-
ary work, the Supreme Court's determination that
transformative value must be reasonably obvious increases the
likelihood that courts may casually dismiss the artistic merit
in these works. The Second Circuit, in fact, purported to accept
that Koons belonged to an artistic movement that sought to
comment on the quality of a society saturated in mass media
images and commodities.' 3 ' Yet, despite this outward accep-
tance, it never attempted to accommodate the practice without
imposing a standard that required the use to give off a parodic
effect.132 As in Koons, under Acuff-Rose, as long as what is
deemed reasonable are those creative strategies that make
their targets obvious and adjust criticism to be digested easily,
new avenues for social comment will be restricted to commer-
cial, and thus, unfair designations.
Indeed, the complete absence of a meaningful review of the
dynamics of Koons's allegorical piece tarnished the court's
entire fair use analysis. Following the requisites of Section
107, the court never discussed whether the artist's intention to
create the sculpture was aimed at commentary and criti-
cism.133 Once the Second Circuit concluded that the sculpture
," Id. at 310.
' Koons, 960 F.2d at 310.
12 Id. at 309-10. Unlike strict appropriationist artists, Koons actually altered
and changed many aspects of Rogers's photograph. The appropriation, as sculpture,
was posed in an entirely different medium than the original photo, the faces of
the seated couple were painted in clown features, daisies were placed in their
hair, the puppies were colored blue, and the mood of the original image was dras-
tically altered:
Not only the placement of the figures, but also the lighting and expres-
sion of Koons's sculpture, are radically different from Roger's underlying
photograph. Koons has changed the medium, scale, colors, expression,
overall mood and artistic content of the photograph. Indeed, those aspects
of Rogers's piece which the court viewed as "original" are no longer ap-
parent in Koons's sculpture. Gone is the "charming" and cuddly warmth
of Rogers's photograph, and in its place is a garish, perhaps horrifying,
perhaps hilarious image.
Greenberg, supra note 24, at 27.
' Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyright-
ed work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or
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bore no traditional resemblance to parody, any further discus-
sion of the sculpture's critical or artistic value no longer
seemed necessary.' However, the court's belief that the
sculpture failed to directly target Rogers's photograph did not
justify denying the sculpture an otherwise statutorily required
evaluation of its critical merits. As one commentator has noted,
[n]either the Copyright Act nor its legislative history limit an artist
to commenting on or criticizing only the underlying copyrighted
work. It seems apparent, instead, that criticism and commentary are
meant to encompass all forms of criticism and commentary, so as
not to restrict freedom of expression impermissibly. " "
If Acuff-Rose had held that a review of a secondary work's
transformative value did not depend on the obviousness of its
criticism or its conventional resemblance to parody,
appropriationists would have a forum, otherwise required by
the Copyright Act, in which its particular kind of criticism
could be judged fairly. However, Acuff-Rose does not compel a
court, influenced by the blatantly commercial nature of an
artwork and resistant to its artistic "quality," to undergo this
statutorily mandated assessment. The Second Circuit's decision
illustrates this point. The court justified its finding that the
first fair use factor weighed against Koons by pointing to the
sculpture's lack of obvious parodic qualities and Koons's "bad
faith" in profiting from the appropriation.'36 Indeed, the court
by any other means specified by that section for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
"' With respect to the first fair use factor, the purpose and character of the
use, the court concluded that: "[tihe problem in the instant case is that even given
that 'String of Puppies' is a satirical critique of our materialistic society, it is
difficult to discern any parody of the photograph 'Puppies' itself. We conclude
therefore that this first factor of the fair use doctrine cuts against a finding of fair
use." Koons, 960 F.2d at 310. Lynne Greenberg captured the irony of this conclu-
sion best when she wrote: "By refusing to recognize the critical nature of the
work, the court emphasized its unsuitability to act as an art critic. In order to be
deemed a 'proper' criticism, a work had best be a rather obvious parody of the
underlying work-otherwise, the court may miss the critical nature of the work
altogether." Greenberg, supra note 24, at 29.
'3 Greenberg, supra note 24, at 30.
'3'The Second Circuit justified this finding of bad faith by evidence that Koons
never asked Rogers for permission to copy the work and that the artist tore the
copyright notice off the postcard reproduction of Puppies when giving the card to
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determined that the appropriationist sculpture was a commer-
cial exploitation of Rogers's original photograph even before it
embarked on its inquiry as to whether the sculpture supplant-
ed the potential market for the original."
Acuff-Rose's holding does not correct the propensity to
follow such faulty logic. It furthermore never prevents a Sony
presumption from excusing courts of ever having to evaluate
whether, in fact, an appropriationist art work supersedes the
original object by replacing its actual or potential markets. In
Koons, when the court ultimately approached the issue of actu-
al or potential market harm to the original photograph, it
failed to recognize that Koons, in fact, had never usurped
Rogers's right of first publication or that Koons's sculpture, a
work in a completely different medium, did not in any way
compete with a black and white photograph. 3 ' Significant to
his artisans. Koons, 960 F.2d at 308-09. The Ninth Circuit, however, in Fisher v.
Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986), held that failure to request a copyright
holder's permission or a holder's express refusal to grant permission does not es-
tablish a defendant's bad faith.
" Koons, 960 F.2d at 312. On the subject of commercial uses, the Second Cir-
cuit has stated that it rejects a fair use defense only in those instances when it
has found that a work may be categorized as a "commercial exploitation." Com-
mercial use alone does not automatically lead to a finding of infringement by
exploitation. It would seem that before the Second Circuit could conclude that a
use was commercially exploitive, it would first have to explore whether the use, in
fact, impinged upon the plaintiffs potential market for the original. See Harper &
Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). Furthermore, even if
Sony and Harper & Row provide that economic harm may be presumed from the
commercial nature of the defendant's use, it would only be proper that the court
clearly state its intention to accept this presumption rather than carelessly label
commercial uses exploitive before addressing the use's harmful economic effects. "A
critical inquiry under [the fourth fair use] factor then is whether defendants Koons
and Sonnabend planned to profit from their exploitation of Puppies without paying
Rogers for their use of his photo-that is, whether Koons' work is primarily com-
mercial in nature. We have already concluded that it is." Koons, 960 F.2d at 312.
1" Greenberg, supra note 24, at 30. Greenberg accurately points out that, in
failing to consider that Rogers had licensed his right to reproduce the photograph
and had commercialized it, the court ignored the economic and utilitarian princi-
ples which justify the fair use defense.
The author of an unpublished work is entitled to a presumption of un-
fairness for an unauthorized taking, in recognition that the author has
not yet reaped the benefits of his or her artistic labor. There would be
an economic disincentive to create if another could usurp the artist's
right to enjoy these benefits, for example, by publishing the work first.
Thus, the typical copyright infringement action grows out of the unautho-
rized commercial exploitation and dissemination of an artistic work by a
third party.
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a thorough review of market harm is the fact that Koons's
sculpture was a commissioned, limited-edition work that was
not marketed in the form of postcard reproductions-the kind
of market in which Rogers's photograph was distributed. In-
stead, the court focused its inquiry on whether Koons planned
to profit from the sculpture without paying Rogers for the
use-a question inappropriate to a fourth factor consideration,
and one that had already been addressed under the court's
first factor analysis. Moreover, the court's standard for review-
ing economic harm did not account for the sculpture's ability to
substitute and satisfy the market demand for the original.
Rather, the Second Circuit merely concluded that the sculpture
threatened general economic harm to the original.139 In fact,
this form of "dilution," from a copyright point of view,
is-absent a moral rights claim'4° -legitimate for the very
reason that its restriction would chill freedom of critical ex-
pression.
Had Koons's sculpture been reproduced and mass market-
ed, as many popular artistic works have been recently, the
court could have found justifiably that the "String of Puppies"
supplanted the demand for the original photograph. In such an
instance, remedial measures could be undertaken either to
require Koons to obtain a license for the original work (without
the original artist's permission but for a reasonable fee), or to
credit the source of the underlying work at the bottom of the
reproduction. The danger of the Second Circuit's decision is
that the court never allowed for fair solutions to be considered.
Far from equitably balancing the rights and needs of both art-
ists, the court's holding, antithetical to copyright law's purpose,
stifled creative expression.
Courts instead could limit commercial exploitation by
applying an effective, but reasonable standard to evaluate
economic harm.'41 Rather than apply a cursory review that
merely questions whether the copyright owner has suffered
Id.
u9 Koons, 960 F.2d at 312.
1 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. 11 1990) (giving visual artists the right to pro-
tect the integrity of a work).
14 Van Hecke, supra note 33, at 486-87; see also Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its
Predecessors, 82 COLM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
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any economic loss, courts should focus on whether the appro-
priation art work actually or potentially serves as a substitute
for the original or its derivative works. Thus, the fourth
factor of the fair use defense would continue to protect the
owner's economic incentives, while an appropriationist artist's
freedom to create would be protected by the first fair use inqui-
ry. Absent a Sony presumption against the appropriationist
use, applying a market substitution standard most accurately
would define market harm because of its ability to identify
when an appropriationist work satisfies the public's demand
for the original, and thus infringes a copyright holder's jus-
tifiable monopoly.
CONCLUSION
Copyright law's ultimate purpose is to foster new creative
works. One of the ways to ensure this is through a limited
monopoly. This monopoly, however, must be balanced against
equally important concerns of artistic freedom of experimenta-
tion. The obstacle that confronts copyright law at present is
the task of making a difficult choice. It is a question that en-
tails either deciding that appropriationism too radically under-
mines convention for the law to adjust or committing to the
work of respecting the subversion. The appropriationist strate-
gy is neither entirely new to the arts nor is it any longer limit-
ed to the theoretical pursuits of a few artists. Like a language,
it communicates criticism, praise, condemnation and celebra-
tion, and its transformative value can be best understood when
it is allowed to speak. Which alternative the law chooses will
largely determine the value of Acuff-Rose to the arts. If a liter-
al approach to Acuff-Rose is inimical to appropriationist works,
their exclusion from fair use is far from inevitable. Given the
.. See Van Hecke, supra note 33, at 486-87. Van Hecke discusses two stan-
dards that courts presently use to evaluate economic harm: the first standard
looks at the competition between the original and the parody, and the second
reviews the adverse effect on the original's market value. Both standards have
hurt parodists, and will continue to harm appropriationist artists, since the former
test requires only a conclusory analysis, most often arising after the use has been
judged on its social or artistic value, and the latter allows courts to "consider ad-
verse impact from any and all sources, including economic loss and reputational
damage from a biting or unwholesome parody."
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potential frequency of copyright infringement suits against
appropriationist artists, and the fact that the Supreme Court
merely addressed the narrow question of commercial parodies,
approached with a view to adjust copyright law to the demands
of art in progress, the Acuff-Rose decision may be interpreted
as a broad formulation of fair use that embraces appropriation-
ist principles. The Supreme Court, in fact, stated that fair use
should not be susceptible to bright line rules, and instead,
should be interpreted according to a case-by-case analysis.
Moreover, Acuff-Rose serves to admonish future courts not
to interpret fair use's statutory factors too narrowly. As the
Court made clear, section 107 provides that parody is merely
one instance, among many, of fair use. When the Supreme
Court accepted Judge Leval's transformative value test, it also
embraced the aesthetic principle that a secondary user may
legitimately use imitation to communicate new meaning about
its target without the effect of superseding it-a dynamic cen-
tral to appropriationism. Indeed, Acuff-Rose confirmed that
replicating the "heart" of an original work to express a critical
message is the very point of genres that operate by way of re-
use.
The spirit of Acuff-Rose suggests that law should not auto-
matically presume with syllogistic simplicity that a creative
work that copies significant portions of a copyrighted original
and exists commercially alongside that original is presump-
tively an unfair use. Thus, Acuff-Rose can and should be ex-
panded to include appropriation art as a valid category of
transformative use. Subsequent court decisions, either
committed to artistic progress or resistant to it, will determine
the degree to which the Supreme Court's decision will foster its
development.
Roxana Badin
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